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David A. Wise 
This volume contains papers presented at a National Bureau of Economic Re- 
search conference on the economics of aging in May 1992. This is the fourth 
in a series of volumes associated with the NBER’s ongoing project on the eco- 
nomics of aging. The preceding volumes, also published by the University of 
Chicago Press, are The Economics of  Aging (1989), Issues in the Economics 
of Aging (1990), and Topics in the Economics of Aging (1992). The goal of the 
economics of aging project is to further our understanding of the consequences 
for older people and for the population at large of  an aging population. The 
papers in this volume deal with death rates and  life expectancy, saving for 
retirement, retirement behavior, demographic transition, international compari- 
sons, and long-term care. 
Demographic Transition and the Federal Budget 
An older age distribution of  the population  will affect many  parts of  the 
economy. Two important  areas are considered  in  this  volume:  government 
spending and the housing market. In chapter 1 John B. Shoven, Michael D. 
Topper, and David A. Wise explore how government spending on a wide range 
of programs is likely to change with a different age distribution of the popula- 
tion. Since many programs are targeted to specific age groups in society, with- 
out change in program  provisions demographic  change will  affect both the 
relative cost of these programs and the combined cost. In providing an indica- 
tion of the magnitudes of the effects that might be expected, the paper serves 
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to underscore the importance of  the issues raised in the subsequent papers in 
this volume. 
Shoven, Topper, and Wise focus on 22 government programs for whom the 
beneficiaries could be identified. The programs account for about 40 percent 
of  all  government expenditure, and they  include  Social  Security, Medicare, 
Medicaid, education, and a range of income support, welfare, and work-related 
programs. In determining the cost of these programs, the study accounts for 
federal, state, and local government expenditures. To isolate the implications 
of demographic change, Shoven, Topper, and Wise assume no change in the 
real cost of each program for individuals of any given age. Thus the analysis 
is independent of any future policy changes, relative price changes, economic 
transitions, or economic growth. 
The authors find that a high concentration of government spending on these 
programs is directed  to older people. For example,  single men between  the 
ages of  15 and 44 receive an average of less than $1,000 from these programs, 
while single men over age 65 receive an average of over $10,000 from these 
programs.  With  the  projected  aging  of  the  population,  the  total  inflation- 
adjusted  cost of  the programs  is estimated  to increase from $669 billion  in 
1990 to $1,106 billion in 2040. This 65 percent increase in real expenditures 
compares with a total population growth of only 27.5 percent. The two largest 
increases are in Social Security expenditures, which would increase  103 per- 
cent  from $203 billion  to $4 12 billion,  and  Medicare expenditures,  which 
would increase 125 percent from $78 billion to $176 billion. (The Social Secu- 
rity increases are likely to be smaller than this projection, owing to the change 
in normal retirement age from 65 to 67, but, based on current trends, the Medi- 
care increases may well be larger, because the projection assumes no increase 
in the relative price of medical care.) 
The results demonstrate the extent to which demographic changes are likely 
to exacerbate the existing budgetary pressures faced by the government. Even 
though many of the programs in this study are considered “entitlements,” the 
authors anticipate strong pressure to cut benefits. They also anticipate that new 
government  initiatives  will  be  crowded  out  by  the  growing  expense of  ex- 
isting programs. 
In  addition,  the  paper  illustrates  the  effect  of  alternative  demographic 
changes, about which there is great uncertainty, on government spending. As 
an alternative to the Social Security Administration’s “best guess” population 
projections, the authors consider the effects of the “optimal” projections dis- 
cussed by Kenneth G. Manton, Eric Stallard, and Burton H. Singer in chapter 
2. Based on the Social Security Administration forecasts, per capita program 
outlays will increase by 37.7 percent between 2000 and 2040, but based on the 
admittedly optimistic estimates of  Manton, Singer, and Stallard, the increase 
would be 126.5 percent. 3  Introduction 
Death Rates and Life Expectancy 
As  demonstrated in chapter 1, our ability to predict future life expectancy 
has important implications for public policy. The future cost of Social Security 
and Medicare, for example, depends directly on the number of older people 
receiving benefits from these programs. While the government routinely makes 
population projections, two studies reported in this volume suggest that there 
may be a lot more uncertainty about future mortality than we typically assume. 
In particular, people may live considerably longer than widely used projections 
anticipate,  so that there could be many  more older people than the projec- 
tions recognize. 
In chapter 2,  Manton, Stallard and Singer model mortality as a function of 
risk factor histories prior to death. They note that part of the decline in mortal- 
ity at older ages has resulted from improvements in these risk factors over time. 
For example, smoking, cholesterol level, and hypertension among the elderly 
have declined over the past two decades. The authors suggest that further im- 
provements can be expected as the result of continued reductions in smoking, 
increased education, and adoption of healthier lifestyles (such as more exercise 
and improved nutrition). Thus the objective of their paper is to estimate the 
future size of the elderly population, using alternative assumptions about how 
the risk factors which affect mortality may change in the future. 
The results suggest that improvements in behavior (and in the resulting risk 
factors) could dramatically reduce mortality at older ages and lead to an older 
population  much  larger  than that estimated by  the  Census Bureau.  For ex- 
ample, the highest Census Bureau estimate of the elderly population in 2040 
is 82.6 million people over age 65, and 17.9  million over age 85. By controlling 
risk factors  to their “optimal”  level, however, Manton, Stallard, and Singer 
project that there would be 138.1 million people over age 65, and 63.7 million 
over age 85. While the authors do not suggest that risk factors will be con- 
trolled to this level, the results demonstrate an enormous amount of uncertainty 
in current population projections. 
This uncertainty is also apparent in chapter 3, by James Vaupel and Hans 
Lundstrom.  This chapter attempts  to distinguish  between  two contradictory 
views of how life expectancy will change in the future. One view is that there 
is a natural limit to longevity of about 85 years, that mortality rates rise dramat- 
ically approaching  this age, and that improvements in mortality  will simply 
lower the variance in life spans around this natural limit. The other view  is 
that mortality rates rise smoothly to very advanced ages and that reductions in 
mortality rates will be achieved at all ages, even at 90, 100, or older. The con- 
troversy between the “limited-life-span’’ and the “mortality-reduction”  para- 
digms has not been resolved, because there has been little reliable data avail- 
able on mortality among the oldest old. Vaupel and Lundstrom use data from 
Sweden from 1900 to 1990 to address the issue. 
This chapter finds that mortality rates have declined at all ages after 60 for 4  David A. Wise 
both men and women and that this decline has accelerated, particularly in the 
older  age categories.  In  1945, for example,  single-year  mortality  rates  for 
women rose above 12.5 percent at age 8  1, and above 25 percent at age 89. By 
1990, single-year mortality  rates  of  12.5 and 25 percent  did not occur until 
ages 87 and 94, respectively. Vaupel and Lundstrom suggest that one interpre- 
tation  of this change is that  an 87-year-old Swedish female in 1990 wits  as 
healthy  (at least in terms of probability of death) as an 81-year-old Swedish 
female in 1945. If these historical rates of progress continue, newborn children 
today will have a life expectancy of  90 years. And if progress accelerates, life 
expectancies may rise to 100 years or more. Thus the oldest-old population of 
the future may be far larger than most current projections suggest. 
Retirement Saving 
Low rates of saving have aroused concern among economists both from a 
macroeconomic perspective, where the concern is about aggregate saving and 
inadequate  capital  accumulation,  and  from  a  microeconomic  perspective, 
where the concern is about older households with little or no retirement saving. 
Two studies reported in this volume address the issue of  saving but deal with 
quite different aspects of the issue: one with the prospects for individual retire- 
ment saving in the future and the other with the low national saving rate. 
Chapter 4 deals with 401(k) plans, which are tax-deferred retirement savings 
plans sponsored by  employers. These plans were the fastest growing saving 
program of  the  1980s and thus  have the potential to significantly affect the 
financial status of  elderly households  in the future. In  chapter 4, James M. 
Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise note, for example, that the number 
of workers eligible to participate in 401(k) plans rose from 7.1 million in 1983 
to 27.5 million in  1988, that the number of participants  increased  from 2.7 
million  in 1983 to 15.7 million in  1988, and that total contributions reached 
almost $40 billion in  1988 and are much larger  now.  The comparison  with 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) is particularly striking, because partic- 
ipation rates among those eligible to participate are far higher for 401(k) plans 
(about 60 percent) than for IRAs. 
An important finding of the study by Poterba, Venti, and Wise is that most 
401(k) saving appears to represent new saving, rather than the transfer of assets 
from other forms of saving. It appears that 401(k) contributions  neither dis- 
place IRA contributions nor substitute for other financial assets. The authors 
make this case by comparing financial assets of similar households after differ- 
ent durations of 401(k) eligibility and by comparing the assets of those eligible 
for 401(k) participation and those who are not eligible. 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise also look at the differences in 401 (k) plan provis- 
ions across employers. The most important of these differences is the employer 
matching rate. For about 35 percent of 401(k) plan participants in the Survey 
of Consumer Finances, for example, the employer matches the employee con- 5  Introduction 
tribution at least dollar-for-dollar. About 25 percent of  plan participants face 
match rates between  10 and 100 percent, and about 40 percent of participants 
face match  rates  below  10 percent. Higher  employer matching  may  induce 
more participation  among employees and higher contributions  among those 
who participate, but the high participation rates are apparently due primarily 
to payroll  deductions  and other aspects of  the employer sponsorship  of  the 
plans that facilitate saving in this form. 
For many households, 401(k) plans represent more than half of their finan- 
cial asset savings. Thus Poterba, Venti, and Wise conclude that 401(k) plans 
are likely to play a very important part in the economic security of retirees in 
the future. 
In chapter 5, Edward P.  Lazear argues that low savings rates may be no more 
than an expression of “tastes.” It may not matter, therefore, that the saving rate 
is lower in the United States than in Japan or that the saving rate is lower today 
than at other times in U.S. history. In fact, Lazear argues, tastes seem to be the 
only way  to reconcile  the difference  in saving rates between  Japan and the 
United States. Lazear suggests that rather than making cross-national compari- 
sons or historical comparisons,  the relevant issue is whether the saving rate 
accurately reflects the intertemporal preferences of people today. Stated differ- 
ently, if  there were no tax distortions or other externalities, any government 
intervention to promote additional saving would lower social welfare. Lazear’s 
discussion provides a quite different view of national savings than most studies 
present. Indeed, the comments on this chapter present a contrasting view. 
Retirement Behavior 
A series of studies by Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. 
Wise has demonstrated the dramatic effect of pension plan provisions on retire- 
ment behavior. Because the value of  pension  plans to employees varies sig- 
nificantly  by  age  and  service  tenure,  there  are financial incentives to  keep 
working at some ages and to retire at other ages. Using an economic model 
that accounts for these financial incentives in pension plans, Lumsdaine, Stock, 
and Wise have been  able to predict,  with considerable  accuracy, retirement 
rates by age for employees of a Fortune 500 company. The models were even 
successful in predicting the retirement behavior that would result from a tem- 
porary “window” plan, using only information about employee decisions be- 
fore the window plan took effect. Because firm pension plans typically contain 
financial incentives to retire even before Social Security eligibility, they  are 
likely to have a substantial influence on the overall labor-force participation of 
older people. 
Chapter 6 is the most recent study in this series. Most of the prior studies 
had used the pension  plans and employment  experience of one Fortune 500 
company to understand the relationship between pension provisions and retire- 
ment behavior. The study in this volume extends this work to a second com- 6  David A. Wise 
pany with similar results. Again, retirement rates by  age are predicted  accu- 
rately based on the financial incentives in the pension plan both during normal 
periods and during a period when a temporary window plan was in effect. 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise also explore several other issues. For example, 
they  find  little  difference  between  the  retirement  behavior  of  men  and  of 
women. They find that the simpler “option value model” of retirement is just 
as effective in predicting  retirement  behavior as a more complex stochastic 
dynamic programming specification, consistent with their prior findings. And 
they explore briefly the high rates of  retirement  at age 65 and the potential 
role of Medicare eligibility in explaining retirement at this age. A compelling 
estimate of the effect of Medicare eligibility, they conclude, will have to await 
more appropriate data. 
Demographic Transition and Housing Values 
In chapter 7, Daniel McFadden explores the effect of demographic change 
on housing prices. In particular, he focuses on how the capital gains associated 
with home ownership have been (and will be) distributed across various gener- 
ations  of  U.S.  households.  The  issue  has  particular  importance  for older 
people, because a large percentage of the wealth of  most elderly households is 
invested  in housing.  And for the current  generation  of  elderly, much of  the 
value of this housing asset resulted from capital appreciation. 
McFadden’s study is based on past and projected changes in the population 
and the resulting changes in the demand for housing. He finds that the real 
price of housing is likely to decline for an extended period in the future. People 
born between  1880 and 1910 achieved a real rate of  return on their housing 
investment of about 3 percent per year. McFadden estimates that real housing 
returns will decline to about 1 percent (annually) for people born around 1915, 
to zero percent for people born around  1930, to -  1 percent for people born 
around 1945, and to -3  percent for people born between  1960 and 1990. De- 
spite the significant variation in capital appreciation  (or depreciation) across 
generations,  McFadden  argues that  real income growth over time has a far 
larger effect on the relative welfare of  different generations. For example, a 
reduction of 0.2 percent in the lifetime income of people born between  1920 
and 1940 would, according to McFadden, fully offset their housing apprecia- 
tion relative to people born in  1950. Nevertheless, the capital gains to be ex- 
pected from homeownership in the future appear to be dramatically lower than 
in the past. 
International Comparisons 
This volume contains two chapters focusing on aging issues in other coun- 
tries,  one  comparing  aging-related  policies  in  Germany  and  in  the  United 
States and one on aging and saving in Taiwan. In chapter 8, Axel Borsch-Supan 7  Introduction 
looks at the policies influencing retirement, saving, and elderly housing deci- 
sions in Germany and compares them with the policies in effect in the United 
States. Germany offers an interesting comparison, because the age composi- 
tion of the population in Germany today is similar to the age composition ex- 
pected  in the United States two decades from now. Thus an analysis of the 
policies in effect in Germany today may provide insights that can be used to 
shape policy for an aging population in the United States. 
Borsch-Supan finds that differences in behavior between Germany and the 
United States are largely consistent with differences in policy incentives. Re- 
tirement policies in Germany, for example, contain stronger incentives to retire 
at particular ages, leading to a more uniform retirement age in Germany than 
in the United States, where policies are more age neutral and more varied in 
their incentive effects. Housing policies in Germany provide subsidies to el- 
derly renters equal to about one-quarter of the rental cost of housing. The result 
is that more older people in Germany rent their homes than is the case in the 
United States, where the subsidies are toward home ownership. Housing mo- 
bility among the elderly is much lower in Germany than in the United States, 
which Borsch-Supan  attributes to the tenant protection  laws. These laws re- 
strict rent increases, even when market rates are rising more rapidly. Thus differ- 
ences in retirement and housing behavior in the two countries can be partially 
explained by differences in policy incentives. Borsch-Supan also discusses the 
policies affecting saving in Germany and the United States, though the rela- 
tionships between these policies and the higher rates of saving in Germany are 
less obvious. Why is it, for example, that more than half of the elderly popula- 
tion in Germany has an annuity income that exceeds expenditures? 
In chapter 9, Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson consider trends in 
saving  behavior  in  Taiwan and  relate  those  trends  to economic and  demo- 
graphic changes. The study provides four broad observations. First, gross na- 
tional saving as a fraction of GNP is very high and is increasing in Taiwan- 
from an  average of  19 percent  between  1961 and  1965 to over  32 percent 
between 1976 and 1990. Second, Taiwan has experienced rapid per capita eco- 
nomic growth, averaging almost 7 percent annually since 1970. Third, fertility 
rates in Taiwan have decreased dramatically from 6.1 in 1958 to 1.9 in 1985. 
Fourth, life expectancies have increased substantially. High growth, declining 
fertility, and increasing  life expectancy  all affect  saving behavior,  and these 
relationships are explored in this study using household survey data on income 
and consumption in Taiwan. 
An important methodological component of the study is the separation of 
age effects and cohort effects, using repeated cross-section data. For each year 
of data, Deaton and Paxson identify the variables of interest, by age, and then 
track people with the same birth year from one survey year to the next. Al- 
though each survey year has different respondents, the authors generate many 
of the benefits of a longitudinal sample using this methodology. Though pre- 
sented with skepticism by the authors, the main conclusion of the paper is that 8  David A. Wise 
household saving behavior in Taiwan is broadly consistent with traditional life- 
cycle explanations of saving. 
Long-Term Care 
The largest users of  nursing home services are the oldest old. Because of 
the enormous population growth anticipated at the oldest ages (close to double 
in the next 30 years), there is a great deal of concern about the future demand 
for nursing home care, the cost of this care, and the extent of public funding 
and insurance for long-term care. Two papers in this volume address nursing 
home utilization, one estimating the probability and duration of nursing home 
residency and one exploring the variation in nursing home use that results from 
alternative long-term care policies. 
In chapter 10  Andrew Dick, Alan M. Garber, and Thomas A. MaCurdy com- 
bine information from two nationally representative data files to more accu- 
rately estimate the likelihood of  a nursing home admission, the likelihood of 
multiple nursing home admissions, and the distribution  of  how long people 
stay in nursing homes after an admission. These probabilities  are important, 
because they  influence insurers’ decisions  about how  to  structure and price 
long-term care insurance policies; government decisions about how to struc- 
ture public health programs for nursing home care; and individual decisions 
about whether to purchase long-term care insurance, how much to save for the 
possibility of future nursing home expenses, and what type of living arrange- 
ments to choose at older ages. 
The results suggest that most people will spend little or no time residing in 
a nursing home but that a substantial minority of people will have extended 
nursing home residency. Beginning at age 65, about 35 percent of individuals 
will have at least one nursing home admission, 10 percent will have more than 
one admission, and less than  1 percent will have more than four admissions. 
The median age of a first nursing home admission is 81 for men and 84 for 
women. Of the individuals with some nursing home utilization, almost 25 per- 
cent  spend a total of  one month  or less, and only half  have more than  six 
months of accumulated nursing home residency. However, almost one-quarter 
of  those  with  some nursing  home  residency  have lengthy  stays, of  three or 
more years, and this minority of the population accounts for a large fraction of 
total nursing home utilization. 
Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy conclude that the small probability of lengthy 
nursing home residency suggests the desirability of long-term care insurance. 
This conclusion, however, depends on the extent to which long-term care in- 
surance induces additional nursing home use. At least some of  the hesitancy 
to enact a comprehensive  long-term  care policy  is based  on this possibility. 
In chapter  11, David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner examine the effect of 
government nursing home policies on nursing home use. While the extent of 
policy variation is  limited, Cutler and Sheiner use variation  across states in 9  Introduction 
both the generosity of  Medicaid  spend-down rules and the price differential 
between Medicaid reimbursement rates and private market rates. 
Cutler and Sheiner conclude that there is indeed a large moral hazard effect 
in subsidizing long-term care. For example, states with more generous Medic- 
aid spend-down rules or higher Medicaid reimbursement rates (relative to mar- 
ket rates) have more nursing home utilization. Higher Medicaid reimbursement 
rates (relative to market rates) also change the composition of  nursing home 
residency, as poorer people have greater access to nursing home care. Cutler 
and Sheiner find that in states with more generous Medicaid policies, nursing 
home care is substituting for care from children or other helpers, rather than 
for independent  living. Thus the elderly are less likely to receive help from 
their children, and more likely to live in nursing homes, when there is a greater 
government subsidy for long-term care. This Page Intentionally Left Blank